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1. Introduction 
With IT systems becoming larger, more intertwined with operations, and involving multiple stakeholders 
from within and outside of organizations, the complexities of IT projects in organizations have escalated 
significantly. The challenge of managing such projects is evident in the dismal state of IT project 
success. Recent surveys conducted by Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
echo similar depressing IT project success rates and reveal that outsourcing, changing user 
requirements, and poor coordination among managers are some of the key reasons driving project 
failure (BBC News, 2007). The latest CHAOS report offers a stark assessment of IT projects in the 
current bleak economic climate (Standish Group, 2009). Twenty-four percent of the projects failed, 
meaning they were canceled before completion or delivery, and never used. The failure rate increased 9 
percent over six years, as shown in a comparison to an earlier survey (Standish Group, 2003). 
 
High profile failures and a large number of “near-failures” have been well documented in IS research. 
For example, the London Stock Exchange’s implementation of Project Taurus was cancelled after the 
exchange spent more than £80 million in five years (Drummond, 1996). The failed implementation of 
a new IT-based luggage management system at Denver International Airport is another case in point. 
It went over budget by US$2 million and was close to 16 months behind schedule before it was 
terminated (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). A more recent example is the Virtual Case File project 
commissioned by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It was originally slated to turn 
operational in late 2003 but was ultimately terminated by early 2005 (Eggen & Witte, 2006; Goldstein, 
2005). The additional cost to roll out the system would have been another US$50 million. According 
to the U.S. Office of the Inspector General (2005), the reasons for failure included poorly defined and 
slowly evolving design requirements, poor contracting practices, and lack of management continuity 
and oversight. These case studies point to the need for ongoing empirical research to understand 
how IT projects can be better managed to avoid project failures. In particular, risk control and risk 
reduction are essential elements in managing complex projects. IT project management should be 
structured in ways that address the major areas of risks (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007).  
2. IT Project Risk Literature 
IT project risk research, while accumulating a formidable body of knowledge over the years, is largely 
characterized by two main approaches: (1) the rational-choice and (2) the cognitive-behavioral 
approaches. The rational-choice approach is grounded in early research on IT project failures by 
McFarlan (1981), Davis (1982), Boehm (1991), and Alter and Ginzberg (1978). They focus on 
surfacing categories known as “risk factors,” such as project novelty and complexity, and suggest 
related strategies to counter these factors. Subsequent work applied organizational theories such as 
socio-technical theory (Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1998), contingency theory (Barki, Rivard, 
& Talbot, 2001), and system theory (Alter & Sherer, 2004) to classify the identified risk factors into 
more formal risk categories. Critiques of this approach point out that it is difficult to draw a 
comprehensive laundry list of risk items at the start of the project or to maintain that list and manage 
the risk factors over the course of a project (Carlo, Lyytinen, & Boland, 2004). In their recent review of 
IT risk literature, Alter and Sherer (2004) noted that at least 228 risk items have been identified. Such 
a lengthy list is unwieldy, and it limits the efficacy of a “checklist-based” risk management approach. 
On the other hand, as noted by Carlo et al. (2004), risk management has to go beyond “controlling or 
mitigating the top ten risks” (p. 59). This is especially so with the increasing complexity of IT projects 
that make it impractical to apply the heuristics of the cause-effect chains in such a risk management 
approach (Lyytinen et al., 1998).  
 
In contrast, the cognitive-behavioral approach to IT project risk is exemplified in the stream of 
research on project escalation (Keil, Mann, & Rai, 2000). This approach turns inward to consider how 
risks are perceived, which psychological factors influence these perceptions, and how these risk 
perceptions, in turn, govern their decisions. Keil and his associates (1995, 2007, 2000; Mähring & 
Keil, 2008) found that various cognitive theories such as avoidance theory and agency theory have 
high explanatory value as to why risk perceptions are distorted. They argue that these distorted 
perceptions explain why decisions and actions do not match the nature and severity of the actual risks. 
While this approach provides insights into the subjective nature of largely individual-based, and to 
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some extent group-based, risk perceptions and how they relate to project failure, these risk 
perceptions are almost exclusively seen from a project manager’s viewpoint. Other project 
stakeholders (e.g., users and vendors) are only considered nominally, as are the socialization 
dynamics in the project (Boehm, 1991; Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001).  
 
Putting these two approaches together, the literature shows that IS failures can be minimized if 
project managers deploy more comprehensive checklists of risk factors and proactively reduce their 
cognitive-behavioral biases. Whether it attempts to create taxonomies of risk factors or attempts to 
uncover the perceptual inaccuracies and distortion surrounding project risks, both approaches 
conceptualize project risk as a value-neutral and observable construct that can be objectively 
assessed and analyzed (Lyytinen et al., 1998; Perrow, 1984). However, we argue that such 
conceptualizations of risk may be problematic on several fronts.  
 
First, such conceptualizations may not sufficiently account for the social and organizational 
complexities of IT projects. Complex IT projects deal with a large number of tightly coupled and 
interactive systems and are, therefore, fraught with high uncertainty and ambiguity (Perrow, 1984). 
This uncertainty is further accentuated by the intangibility of the IT deliverables. They often involve 
multiple stakeholders working on complicated, interdependent functional requirements. These 
conditions point to a social context where many participants interact constantly to make sense of 
project uncertainty and ambiguity. How they encounter, experience, and subsequently communicate 
with one another what they understand as potentially deleterious to the project is important in 
developing a richer shared understanding of the project (Power, 2007). Cultural scholars such as 
Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky have long argued that risks should be treated as “social 
processes rather than physical entities that exist independently of the humans who assess and 
experience them” (Bradbury, 1989, p. 389). Risks are, thus, not absolute, but local and contextual. 
They are to be defined and accepted by the relevant stakeholders in a particular social setting (Stahl, 
Lichtenstein, & Mangan, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, these views of project risk often do not account for the temporal, emergent, and 
dynamic nature of project risks (Alter & Sherer, 2004; Mahring & Keil, 2008). Project risks change as 
the organizational and institutional conditions surrounding IT projects evolve (Berkun, 2005). It is an 
ongoing affair of risk identification, assessment, and mitigation, which goes beyond the well-
bracketed episodic probes that characterize formal project risk management methodologies. The lack 
of dynamism in risk assessment is particularly salient when we consider the process by which IT 
projects fail, of how projects muddle along as conditions continually shift and signals of impending 
failure may appear and also quickly fade away. 
 
Drawing our theoretical bases from both the social construction of risk in sociology (e.g., Tierney, 
1999) and the social constructionist approach in IS (e.g., Orlikowski & Gash, 1994), we seek to offer a 
social constructionist view of project risk as an alternative theorizing of the process of risk 
management in situ in IT projects. In this light, we treat the multiple interpretations of risk in complex 
IT projects neither as wrongful readings of risks “out there,” nor as embedded cognitive biases, but as 
situated accounts of risk that diverse stakeholder groups hold as they make sense of a disorderly 
world.  
 
Consistent with risk researchers (e.g., Hansson, 2010; Tierney, 1999; and Renn, 2008), our position 
is that risks are both fact-laden and value-laden; they contain both objective and subjective elements. 
Yet, the state of IS project research has been preoccupied with existing risk management methods 
and has consequently ignored situated risk in the broader societal fabric. Wynne (1992) expressed 
similar concern that “the obsession with physical risk… deletes the deeper questions about 
institutional behaviors and social relations” (p. 755). What the social constructionist approach adds to 
the discussion is the interplay among the broader social structures and the interaction among the 
multiple stakeholder groups (e.g., users, IT departments, and vendors). 
 
This is particularly relevant for complex IT projects, where multiple stakeholders are likely to come 
from different backgrounds, with different expertise and vested interests, to develop complex systems 
under complex project governance. Risks are likely to be perceived differently and deemed to be of 
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varying degrees of criticality by different stakeholders. How the multiple interpretations of risk 
converge and diverge across the stakeholders is a question of interest to us. To this end, we believe 
that the social constructionist approach toward project risk is complementary to traditional risk 
approaches. It not only draws attention to the social interaction process through which risks are 
constructed but also widens the consideration to include the broader social structures that may 
perpetuate specific social orders, leading to the inclusion of some risks and the exclusion of others 
(Vaughan, 1996), with direct consequences on project outcomes.  
 
In the next section, we detail how the literature on the social construction of risk, particularly from 
sociology, can enrich and extend our conceptualization of risk management in IT projects. 
3. Social Construction of Risk 
Discussions on the social construction of risk have their roots in the sociological literature on the 
social construction of reality and the scientific enterprise (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979; Pinch & Bijker, 1984), and the more specific field of natural hazards and disaster 
research (Clarke & Short, 1993; Renn, 1992, 2008; Tierney, 1999; Vaughan, 1996, 1999). Central to 
this view is that risk is a social construct that reflects how society deals with uncertainty (Otway & 
Thomas, 1982). This perspective goes beyond risks as externally quantifiable objects or as individual 
cognitive biases to conceive risks as products of social interactions, deeply embedded in social 
structures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Manning, 1989; Tierney, 1999). A social constructionist 
approach does not claim that risk does not exist. Rather, it seeks to understand the process through 
which "social agents create and use boundaries to demarcate that which is dangerous" (Clarke & 
Short, 1993, p. 379). 
 
In trying to make sense of the uncertainties, different social groups come to define and attach 
meanings to a risk artifact (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Tierney, 1999). Their past experiences, 
knowledge differentials, vested interests, and value differences shape the way they construct their 
risk accounts (Orbuch, 1997). These accounts are verbal or written explanations about the likelihood 
of unanticipated events happening as individuals or groups profess understanding of their 
environment (Scott& Lyman, 1968). The risk accounts are subjected to a process of negotiation and 
contestation, with growing or diminishing degrees of stabilization toward consensus or conflict. Risk 
is, thus, conceived dynamically as being inter-subjective (i.e., shared among individuals and between 
groups), going beyond individuals’ subjective perceptions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991). 
Expressions of this inter-subjectivity are consolidated in the “accounts” that social groups create 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Orbuch, 1997).  
 
The negotiation and contestation of these risk accounts are influenced by broader social structures 
such as cultural norms, political power, economic interests, institutional pressures, and organizational 
agendas. Specifically, sociological research on disasters unravels how such forces shape the social 
understanding of risk (Tierney, 1999; Vaughan, 1999). 1  Several prominent sociological studies 
(though at the societal level of analysis) found that what constitutes risk, what type of risk models are 
employed, and how estimates of risk are constructed are the end results of economic and political 
negotiations as well as decisions influenced by existing organizational structures and their inter-
relationships (Clarke & Short, 1993; Vaughan, 1996, 1999). Perrow (1984) and Shrader-Frechette 
(1985), for example, described how nuclear power risk assessments were influenced by 
organizational considerations, resulting in the exclusion of many potential causes of system failure. 
Others showed how factors such as culture and institutions (e.g., media and government agencies) 
amplify or attenuate specific interpretation of risk via a network of socially mediated communication 
channels (Kasperson et al., 1988; Masuda & Garvin, 2006).  
 
The context of negotiation and contestation is also highly emergent, with the possibility of major 
unexpected events occurring that may tilt the underlying socialization dynamic in risk construction. This 
idea of prominent events shaping historical trajectories is also found in disaster research. In disaster 
                                                   
1 As our aim is to highlight streams of research that are useful in building a theoretical framework of social construction of project risk, 
we do not provide an exhaustive survey of disaster research. Besides Tierney (1999), for a more detailed account of the social 
construction of risk in disaster research, refer to Tierney (2007) and Renn (1992). 
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research, “focusing events” refer to sudden, relatively uncommon social events that are harmful or 
reveal the possibility of greater future harms (Birkland, 1998; Tierney & Bevc, 2007). These events 
are often known to policy makers and the public simultaneously and serve as potential catalysts for 
policy change (Birkland, 1998). They are attention-grabbing (typically catastrophic) events that trigger 
social processes among actors or stakeholders to focus and call into question existing structures and 
understanding. They serve to open up a forum for the affected stakeholders to re-negotiate issues 
and examine taken-for-granted assumptions. Such social change dynamically modifies the 
construction of risk.  
 
Extending the research in the social construction of risk into managing complex IT projects, we 
contend that the notion of IT risk is also a dynamic outcome of the social construction process. While 
the social constructionist perspective has been applied in the IS literature, such research tends to 
focus on how the meaning of IT is socially constructed during its adoption, design, and use, and not 
on the domain of IT risk management. These IS social constructionist studies are exemplified by the 
stream of research on technological frames (Davidson, 2006; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). They 
conceive organizations as made up of different stakeholder groups (analogous to the distinct social 
groups in the society, writ large) and that each group holds different views or understandings of the 
focal technology. Such views are defined as a “technological frame” – a socio-cognitive construct that 
incorporates knowledge and expectations that guide actors’ interpretations and actions related to IT 
(Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). The key contribution of such studies has been to demonstrate how the 
degree of incongruence of technological affects project outcomes, subsequent technological use, and 
related organizational outcomes (e.g., Davidson, 2002; Lin & Silva, 2005). Subsequent studies have 
extended the content of technological frames from technological attributes and use to systems 
development (Davidson, 2006) or IT’s impact on organizational work practices (Wagner & Newell, 
2006; Yeow & Sia, 2008).  
 
Recent research has also begun addressing the sources of technological frames and the dynamics of 
frame construction and change. One stream of studies explores the role of negotiations, 
contestations, power and politics, and other social processes by which technological frames are 
socially constructed (Azad & Faraj, 2008; Lin & Silva, 2005; McLoughlin, Badham, & Couchman, 
2000; Wagner & Newell, 2006; Yeow & Sia, 2008). Another stream of research looks at how emergent 
events such as “critical encounters” or “discrepant events” could lead to a series of significant social 
interactions that shift a group’s technological frame (Majchrzak, Rice, Malhotra, King, & Ba, 2000; 
Newman & Robey, 1992; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994). Finally, some research has also begun to consider 
how larger institutional and cultural influences permeate organizational boundaries to shape 
stakeholders’ frames of technology (Barrett & Walsham, 1999). These insights from this ongoing IS 
constructionist research – ranging from the negotiation and contestation of locally situated 
organizational stakeholders, to the significance of emergent events, to broader institutional forces – 
mirror and resonate with some of the key concepts found in the social constructionist study of risk 
reviewed above. 
 
By grounding our research in the social constructionist view of risk, we expand this stream of social 
constructionist research in IS beyond the core technology artifact to the domain of IT risk 
management. How are notions of risks in IT projects constructed? Why are some project risks 
accepted as key project risks while others are rejected or trivialized? Drawing on concepts from the 
social construction of risk in sociology (e.g., risk accounts, social interaction, social structures, 
focusing events) and relevant ones from the social constructionist research in IS, we seek to see how 
these factors play out in the context of a failing IT project. Specifically, the aim of the study is to create 
a process model (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) in illuminating the social construction 
process of risk in IT projects – a complex process that, in the view of Latour & Woolgar (1979), 
“involve(s) the use of devices whereby all traces of production are made extremely difficult to detect.” 
We show the utility of introducing these concepts in clarifying the process of social construction of risk 
in IT projects through an in-depth case study of a large IT project implementation in an Asian logistic 
firm. The IT project underwent several major disruptions and suffered major slippages, but was 
launched, albeit belatedly. The complex project dynamics over time provided an ideal context for us to 
examine the processes of risk construction. In the next section, we present the case site and 
research methodology. 
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4. Research Method 
4.1. Background of case site 
Leveraging an opportunity to track and analyze the trajectory of IT implementation issues and 
challenges, we conducted a case study of a major IT project slippage in a large Asian logistic firm. It 
is a large and established organization, in business for over 40 years and employing more than 
10,000 people. The firm has three major lines of business, each dedicated to a particular transport 
means – Air, Land, and Sea Logistics. A key strategic business niche is in the warehousing and 
transportation of hazardous materials (e.g., combustible goods). Each hazardous materials business 
unit (HMBU) functions autonomously under its respective larger transport-centric business unit. 
Figure 1 presents the organizational structure of the logistics firm. 
 
Corporate (Management)
IT Department (ITD)
Land Logistics Sea Logistics Air Logistics
HMBU (Land) HMBU (Sea) HMBU (Air)
 
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of Logistic Firm 
 
In 2001, the firm embarked on a strategic IT project to improve its competitive edge in the hazardous 
materials business. The project (“Project Alpha”) consisted of (1) a sophisticated IT system that would 
automate its storage warehousing and transporting operations and (2) a novel “containerization” 
concept that would radically streamline and expedite the warehousing, transfer, and delivery of 
hazardous goods using standard size containers. The system would enable seamless logistic 
integration across its land, sea, and air businesses. Through consolidated and centralized planning, it 
would substantially enhance inventory visibility, safety, security, and accountability in managing the 
hazardous materials. The old logistic management system was largely transactional, comprising a few 
stovepipe standalone systems. There was limited inventory information to manage across the multiple 
warehouses. Planning, control, and management of warehousing and logistic activities (e.g., storage 
allocation, safety audit, fleet management, job scheduling, and replenishment planning) were non-
standardized and carried out manually, using only simple spreadsheets. The jump in sophistication in its 
operations was substantial. The new system comprised 20 highly inter-dependent modules; of which 
half were intelligent modules consisting of complex planning and scheduling engines. Figure 2 provides 
the overview of the key modules in the new IT system. 
 
The IT Department (i.e., ITD) was in charge of Project Alpha. ITD was part of an IT shared service 
organization that managed the full range of IT services -- system acquisition, development, and 
operation -- for the firm. Given the management’s decision to structure Project Alpha as a fixed-price 
“turnkey”2 project, ITD coordinated the outsourcing of the project implementation. The outsourcing 
vendor was “to be solely responsible for the design, development and implementation of the new 
system” (as per contract specification). The vendor, in turn, subcontracted the intelligent system 
component to another IT specialist firm. 
                                                   
2 ITD was a mature shared service organization, having developed many of the mission-critical applications for users in the past. 
Project implementations typically followed a well-established in-house system implementation methodology. The “turnkey” 
development approach was, at that point in time, a recent addition and emphasized careful vendor and contract management. 
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Figure 2. Overview of New IT System 
 
In terms of project management, an ITD manager was designated as the Corporate Project 
Manager “to monitor the progress of the project, conduct checkpoint reviews and ensure the timely 
and quality delivery of the system” (as per contract specification). An experienced manager from 
Land HMBU was appointed as the Operations (Ops) Manager “to coordinate all users for the 
requirement specification, user training, and system operations” (as per contract specification). 
Both the Corporate Project Manager and the Ops Manager co-chaired the project management 
team. The Vendor Project Manager, who was under the Corporate Project Manager’s charge, was 
responsible for the subcontractor. Above the project management team were two committees: (1) 
the working committee and (2) the steering committee. The working committee was initially chaired 
by the Head of HMBU only and was later co-chaired with a senior management representative from 
ITD in early 2005. The steering committee was helmed by the Head of Operations from Corporate 
Unit, who was responsible for all three land, sea, and air B.U.s. Although the committee was the 
highest level of project oversight, because its members had responsibility largely for the general 
management of the hazardous materials business, it was not fully dedicated to Project Alpha. 
Figure 3 illustrates the project management structure. 
 
Project Alpha formally kicked off in April 2001 and was initially scheduled for rollout by the land B.U. 
by mid-2004. The project’s progress, however, was constantly disrupted. Two major crises that 
nearly crippled the project deserve mention. First, the vendor’s subcontractor went bankrupt early 
in the project. A second subcontractor was found, which was followed by a series of antagonistic 
client-vendor interactions that led to the second crisis, when the vendor mutinied and staged a 
dramatic stand-off in late 2004. Through management intervention, the project managed to hobble 
on and was eventually completed at the end of 2007. The project slippage was close to three years, 
after six revisions of the commissioning date for the IT system. Figure 4 shows the timeline for 
Project Alpha. 
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Figure 3. Project Management Structure 
 
 
Figure 4. Project Alpha Timeline 
4.2. Data Collection and Analysis 
We were invited by ITD in the later stage of the project (i.e., early 2006) to provide an independent 
report of the key events, issues, and lessons derived from this project. As neutral observers, we did 
not intervene with any project decisions. We collected our data from two main sources. First, we 
examined online and offline archival data, including project proposal reports, tender specifications, 
contracts, official correspondence (e.g., emails, letters), project progress reports, project management 
plans, minutes of meetings, and presentation slides. These materials were especially useful for us to 
trace the sequence of actions and events that occurred between 2000 and 2006. Specifically, they 
helped us construct or validate the risk accounts for different stakeholders.  
 
Second, we conducted 14 interviews with the key actors in Project Alpha. Table 1 shows the 
breakdown of the interviews by stakeholder group. Although the number of interviews was relatively 
low, we covered all the stakeholder groups involved, i.e., ITD, HMBU users, vendor, and 
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Subcontractor, and targeted all key individuals who had significant influence over the construction of 
risk accounts by the respective stakeholders. 
 
Reflecting Myers and Newman’s (2007) call to situate the researchers within their interviews, we 
entered the field as “known” investigators (Lofland & Lofland, 1995), and our interviewees were 
aware that our intent was to understand their views on the trajectory of the project. We also 
deployed a “portfolio” of roles and identities that was contingent on the situations we encountered. 
For instance, we demonstrated “acceptable incompetence” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995) to draw out 
elaboration from our interviewees. This quintessential student role encouraged them to flesh out 
their arguments, such as providing concrete examples to illustrate their more abstract ideas. On 
other occasions, we also displayed “selective competence” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995) to enhance 
our credibility as IT project management researchers. 
 
Table 1. Breakdown of Interviews by Stakeholder Groups 
Stakeholder # Interviews # Distinct Interviewees 
ITD 7 5 
  Senior Executives  3      2 
  Project Manager  3  1 
  Project Team Leads  1    2 
HMBU Users 4 6 
  Head of HMBU  1  1 
  Ops Manager 
  User Representatives 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 4 
Vendor 2 2 
  Senior Executive  1  1 
  Project Manager  1  1 
Subcontractor 1 2 
  Senior Project Consultants  1  2 
Total                                      14 15 
 
Each interview lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours, with one researcher doing most of the inquiry  and 
the other focused on note-taking. We conducted most interviews one-to-one, but for those at the 
lower level, we conducted group interviews, as these group sessions provided a familiar and less 
threatening environment to generate richer discussion in the context of a failing IT project (Nahar, 
Lyytinen, Huda, & Muravyov, 2006). We did not use a tape recorder, as interviewees were more 
comfortable discussing issues without one. We consolidated our notes for each interview and typed 
them within 24 hours. We promptly resolved differences in the interview notes through discussion 
and clarification. 
 
We conducted these interviews over a seven-month period toward the end of the project, i.e., from 
April to October 2006. Recognizing the limitation of recall biases in retrospective accounts, we 
actively corroborated the events, issues, and themes noted in these interviews with intensive 
archival data analysis and field observations at case sites. Where appropriate, we cued the 
interviewees on key events that they had omitted, or challenged them on inconsistencies that we 
could identify. 
 
Given that our data are process data (i.e., sequences of events that were contextual and of variable 
temporal embeddedness (Langley, 1999), we adopted a process approach to analyze how project 
risk is socially constructed. In line with extant process studies, we adopted the definition of 
“process” as “the sequences of interactions and activities that unfold over the duration of the entity 
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being studied in context” (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 197). As such, we followed Langley’s (1999) idea of 
combining narrative strategy and temporal bracketing strategy in our data analysis. The narrative 
strategy essentially involves the construction of a detailed story from the raw data using time as its 
main anchor point. Accordingly, we crafted an in-depth and chronological narrative of the entire 
implementation process. It formed the base document for summarizing the vast amount of 
information available in the primary dataset of archival and interview data. We also used it as a 
validation tool (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, as part of the deliverables, we asked various key actors to 
verify the 40-page case report (i.e., ITD, users, and vendor) before we formally submitted it to 
corporate management. Second, we used the report for case discussion and reflection within the 
firm’s in-house project management training. We were subsequently invited to facilitate a case 
discussion on the project, with a joint panel of representatives from various stakeholder groups, 
namely, the ITD Project Manager, HMBU Ops Manager, and Vendor Project Manager. These events 
solidified our confidence that our analysis and reporting were authentic and credible (Golden-Biddle 
& Locke, 1993). 
 
Next, we used the narrative as the basis to identify phases, following the temporal bracketing 
strategy (Langley, 1999, p. 707). In essence, the temporal bracketing strategy attempts to surface 
activities or interactions within a certain period that have certain continuity and are “bracketed” by 
discontinuities. Each continuous period is referred to as a phase, though not in a predictable 
sequential sense. This approach is widely adopted within IS process studies, e.g., Newman and 
Robey’s (1992) encounter-episode framework. In our analysis of phases, we focused on the risk 
accounts that were held by the various key stakeholders. From the project archives (e.g., project 
minutes and email correspondence) and the interviews, we analyzed the initial risk accounts of the 
three main stakeholder groups (i.e., ITD project management, Land HMBU users, and 
vendor/subcontractor). 
 
We then sought to understand how antecedent conditions such as their historical backgrounds, the 
way they perceived their roles and responsibilities, how they viewed the new IT system, and the 
main challenges they saw in implementing it influenced the initial risk accounts. Next, we analyzed 
the social interaction events as the different stakeholders engaged each other in the project, i.e., 
how the respective risk accounts were (or were not) communicated to the other stakeholders and 
the responses from others. We also sought to surface the social structures that shaped the social 
interaction events. For example, the initial gap between the dominant risk account and the 
individual risk accounts of users and vendors was attributed to the dominant position of ITD in the 
project structure. The resultant dominant risk accounts were derived from the actual risk 
management decisions and risk mitigating actions taken at the project level (e.g., non-escalation 
decision despite the withdrawal of first subcontractor, the appointment of ITD senior manager to co-
chair Project Working Committee). Finally, we surfaced specific discontinuities, i.e., focusing 
events, which interrupted the path of interactions. Thus, each set of social interaction and risk 
mitigation actions formed our phases, while focusing events marked the start and end of these 
phases.  
 
The first and second authors conducted the process data analyses, while the third author played 
the devil’s advocate, asking clarification questions or offering alternative interpretations. In 
essence, he ensured that the team did not conclude the analysis prematurely (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
5. Project Alpha’s Failing Trajectory 
5.1. Project kick-off: Initial enthusiasm and optimism 
Project Alpha started when the senior management at the logistics firm was planning various 
organizational transformation initiatives. There was substantial enthusiasm and excitement for the 
strategic change. Although HMBU users were not heavy users of IT and, hence, generally not 
technologically savvy, they were enthusiastic about the potential benefits the new IT system would 
bring. Project Alpha was hailed as a quantum leap that would sharpen the firm’s competitive edge. 
It was expected to significantly maximize operating efficiency, reduce cycle time, and enhance the 
quality of inspection and surveillance for hazardous materials. 
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Five established IT consulting firms were invited to submit their tender proposals for the project. 
However, only two firms responded. 3  Facilitated by ITD, the users went through a rigorous 
assessment using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to select the eventual vendor for Project 
Alpha. The AHP was a well-established risk management process instituted by the organization for 
vendor evaluation and selection. The process separated evaluation of tender by allocating price and 
technical/performance assessment to different teams. The technical/performance assessment was 
based on an index of one vendor’s scores against the other in terms of 19 factors including company 
profile, development experience, domain expertise, project management, qualification/certification, 
management commitment, and compliance with functional specifications. The price quotes were then 
provided to a separate team for a cost effectiveness calculation after the technical/performance 
evaluation was completed and approved by senior management. The proposal with the best benefit-
cost ratio was selected. The rigorous process was to ensure that ITD and HMBU selected the most 
worthy and qualified vendor. The vendor, too, projected a confident image, and its partner 
subcontractor had won various accolades in the industry.  
 
Initially when we started we had a lot of optimism and from the tender, the vendors gave 
us an impression that they could do anything. (Interview with Ops Manager) 
5.2. Short-lived optimism – ITD’s risk account emerging as dominant 
The initial optimism was short-lived. Within the first six months of project initiation, there were already 
indications that the implementation of Project Alpha would be rough, with increasing grousing from 
various parties about vague user requirements, complex technical interfaces, poor progress updates, 
inadequate documentation, etc. Driven by their different roles in the project, the ITD, users, and 
vendor were evidently concerned with different problems and issues. Table 2 shows the different risk 
accounts we reconstructed from the project archives (e.g., project minutes and email 
correspondence) and the interviews.  
 
The users’ risk account was concerned with technical risk where the new system may fail to provide 
required functionalities and performance. Their risk account was about managing innovation 
complexity. Users were concerned mainly with ensuring that all their requirements would be captured 
and accommodated in the new system, especially with respect to the design of the relatively novel 
and unfamiliar containerization solution for hazardous logistics. This was also reflected in their skimpy 
requirement specifications, as the specifications were spelled out only in terms of expected system 
capabilities but had few details on how such solutions could be devised and built. On the other hand, 
from the vendor and its subcontractor, the risk account was focused on risk of scope creep; it was 
largely described as controlling the changing user requirements and preventing scope creep. They 
were particularly conscious of the fixed-price nature of the contract.  
 
The risk account of ITD was also different. Driven by the mentality of a “turnkey approach,” ITD saw 
its role primarily as a vendor manager. Their risk account was centered on vendor management risk 
in that the vendor might not deliver Project Alpha based on the agreed contractual terms of reference. 
They were careful to monitor the delivery schedule and progress reports, holding bi-weekly progress 
meetings and expecting the production of a monthly report. They were insistent on compliance, e.g., 
the adherence to technical architecture, software development, and documentation standards. 
Outstanding issues and performance metrics were closely tracked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
3 The lack of tender interest by three other established IT firms was not picked up by ITD as a potential risk indicator. The second 
subcontractor (who was involved in the drafting of the tender document), however, noted the lack of response was probably 
indicative of the project complexity, which should have triggered a reassessment of risk by ITD. 
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Table 2. Key Stakeholders’ background, roles and risk accounts 
 ITD HMBU Users Vendor 
Background - Strong IT culture: part of a 
large IT shared service 
organization (separate 
legal entity) 
- Physically located in a 
separate building from 
users 
- Deep technical IT 
expertise, with 
established system 
development 
methodologies 
- Limited understanding of 
HMBU operations, as ITD 
had no prior application 
development experience 
with HMBU  
- Strong business culture: 
high responsiveness to 
customers 
- Deep logistics operations 
knowledge  
- Limited IT skills: prior 
logistics handling and 
planning largely manual, 
relying only on simple 
spreadsheet analysis 
- Traditionally rely on ITD 
to manage all IT matters  
 
- Strong professional IT 
consulting culture  
- Among the top three 
vendors locally 
- Expertise largely in IT 
system implementation  
- Had prior working 
experience with ITD but 
not with HMBU 
- Limited expertise in 
logistics operations 
optimization: Dependent 
on subcontractor for 
specialized expertise in 
logistics planning  
 
View of New IT 
System 
 
- Viewed new IT system as 
a structured IT project to 
be delivered completely 
by vendor as a finished 
package   
 
- Viewed new IT system 
as a novel and 
innovative IT project that 
would tap the specialized 
expertise of the vendor 
to leapfrog their 
competitors 
 
- Viewed new IT system 
as an IT consulting 
engagement to develop 
system to cater to the 
ways users wanted to 
transform their logistic 
operations 
Project Roles and 
Responsibilities 
- Corporate Project 
Manager, in charge of the 
overall implementation of 
Project Alpha 
- With the “turnkey” 
approach, ITD saw its 
role more specifically as 
vendor manager 
- Co-chaired Project 
Management Team 
- Operations Manager, 
tasked with ensuring 
user requirements were 
adequately addressed 
and captured 
- Co-chaired Project 
Management Team 
 
- Vendor Project Manager, 
tasked with designing, 
building, and delivering 
system in the “turnkey” 
approach, through a 
fixed price contract 
 
Risk Account - Vendor Management: 
Vendor might not deliver 
new system based on the 
contractual terms of 
reference  
 
- Innovation Risk: Vendor 
could not design and 
implement their 
requirements, especially 
in applying the novel and 
unfamiliar 
containerization solution 
- Scope Creep: Users 
would supply vague or 
changing user 
requirements with 
possible scope creep  
 
Risk Mitigating 
actions 
- To tighten vendor 
management: exerting 
tighter control on vendor, 
scrutinizing contract, and 
demanding adherence to 
planned milestones and 
detailed documentation   
- To manage innovation 
complexity: clarifying and 
understanding the 
complex design of the 
containerization solution 
in meeting their 
requirements 
 
- To manage and control 
user requirements: 
delineating clear decision 
authority and enforcing 
timely and proper sign-
offs  
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Among the various accounts, however, ITD’s risk account dominated, given its advantageous position 
as the formal corporate project manager for Project Alpha. Although both ITD and users co-chaired 
the Project Management Team (PMT, see Figure 3), the “real” formal authority of the project was with 
ITD, as users, historically, had been passive and left most IT matters to ITD. As a result, the risk 
account of ITD was amplifying the vendor management risk, while the risk accounts of the users (in 
managing innovation complexity) and vendor (in controlling user requirements) were attenuated. 
Accordingly, the Corporate Project Manager and his lieutenants read the various negative project 
signals that arose not as innovation complexity or user requirement management issues, but rather 
as indications of a vendor management problem. An illustrative example was that ITD had repeatedly 
brushed aside suggestions that Project Alpha entailed a high level of experimentation and prototyping 
due to its innovation novelty and the complex interdependency involved. Instead, ITD saw the Project 
Alpha project as “just another project” and expressed puzzlement at the difficulties the vendor faced 
in building the new logistic system.  
 
(It is normal that) Every system has their peculiar and unique functions. I really don’t see 
why [Project Alpha] should be different (and therefore difficult to manage). (Interview with 
ITD Senior Manager)  
 
Yet, evidence of such novelty and complexity were frequently articulated in the interviews with the 
other stakeholders. In particular, the second subcontractor, being most knowledgeable about 
hazardous materials logistics operations, unreservedly recognized these challenges of Project Alpha: 
 
People always think that it is just another logistic or warehousing system. [Project Alpha] 
is not just transactional. The planning engines drive the whole system. They involve 
complex concepts and optimization algorithms…There are a lot of combinational 
possibilities. The organization needs to have an accurate feel of the technical challenges. 
[Project Alpha] is not another IT project! 
 
You need to chop up [Project Alpha] into smaller pieces to specify the requirements. But 
each piece is still a “monster.” You need to chop further. For example, in designing [one 
of the intelligent component modules], there are thousands of tasks when it comes to 
delivery during peak period, but during the lull period, the number is in the low hundreds. 
You need to decide at what level to configure the tasks. If the task units are too minute, 
the planning model will be too big to solve. Once the peak period kicks in, you will be dead 
(i.e., the system will fail). Unfortunately, not everyone understands this kind of complexity. 
 
The risk accounts of the users and vendor were not totally “muted,” but their emergence was 
constrained by the limited social interaction with ITD during the course of the project. Physically, even 
though ITD had allocated workstations in a separate building with the vendor consultants, they stayed 
mainly in their own office and, hence, had limited visibility into the vendor’s work activities. In 
particular, ITD’s “I-manage-the-vendor” orientation and “us-against-them” mentality inhibited a two-
way interaction between ITD and the vendor. The resulting risk mitigating actions followed largely 
from the dominant ITD’s risk account.  
 
As such, ITD was very diligent in chasing the vendor (typically over email). They sent multiple 
reminders to ensure tight adherence to project milestones and provide detailed documentation. They 
were keen only on doing vendor control tasks but showed little interest in understanding the actual 
operational challenges on the ground. ITD was keen to maintain its role as the controller, reluctant to 
get its hands dirty, and afraid that “if I do it, it will become my job.” 
 
If we help them (the vendor) more, those tasks will gradually become our job. 
Coordinating with users in arranging or changing requirement meetings was one 
example. After a while, they just expected us to do it. (Interview with Deputy ITD Project 
Manager B)  
 
As explained by the ITD Project Manager himself using a river metaphor, ITD was not the river that 
directed the water flow, but “the bank that prevents the water from flooding.” ITD’s focus on tight 
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supervision and persistent requests for formal reports and constant updating resulted in a defensive 
stance by the vendor. The vendor was careful and selective in information sharing for fear of raising 
unnecessary alarms, which could invite immediate reprimands from ITD.  
5.3. First crisis: ITD shaking off doubts about its dominant risk account 
In late 2002, the first subcontractor suddenly withdrew from Project Alpha due to bankruptcy. The users 
were shocked. ITD, too, had been kept in the dark. However, it had suspected problems as early as 
mid-2002 when the vendor’s deliverables were falling behind schedule, and the vendor started to give 
evasive reasons. 
 
We had some sensing when things were behind schedule then, and (our vendor) was very 
evasive…The writing was on the wall, but could it be just graffiti? (ITD Project Manager) 
 
Without conducting a deeper investigation to understand the extent of the problem, ITD quickly 
interpreted the issue as the “vendor’s problem”4 and demanded that the vendor seek a new partner 
without delay. Within three months, the vendor recruited a new subcontractor with expertise in 
hazardous materials in early 2003.  
 
Despite the relatively quick replacement of the sub-contractor, the incident had cast some doubts on 
ITD’s dominant risk account. Picking up some weak indication of project complexity (e.g., a 
reassessment by the new subcontractor that only 5 percent of the containerization solution designed by 
the old subcontractor was deemed usable), the users became more skeptical of ITD’s risk account that 
it was merely a vendor management problem. Through a now more vocal and interactive Ops Manager, 
for example, users began raising issues about the clarity of the innovative containerization solution in 
the new system. Instead of working more closely with the vendor and the new subcontractor to 
understand more about the solution complexity, ITD again adopted a hands-off approach, showing a 
general lack of interest in understanding the users’ risk account. However, to appease the users, ITD 
took to the commissioning of an independent review to study the feasible containerization solution. The 
commissioned study was, unfortunately, superficial and remained “too high level to be useful,” in the 
opinion of the users and the new sub-contractor.  
 
Similarly, the vendor was becoming frustrated with its inability to enact risk mitigating actions to contain 
user requirements, given its lack of authority and the lack of support from ITD project management (e.g., 
the unexpected planning requirements of having to incorporate staging areas and sampling policies for 
safety check). The vendor also began raising questions and seeking clarification about its roles and 
authority in a turnkey development approach, in its attempt to dispute the dominant risk account that 
Project Alpha needed to deal with expanding user requirements.  
 
However, ITD was quick to produce counter-evidence to reinforce its risk account. For example, the ITD 
Project Manager carefully archived the trails of correspondences and could quickly produce a binder of 
email correspondence to the users and minutes of meetings that showed the “incompetence and lack of 
professionalism” of the vendor, affirming its risk account that vendor management was the risk to be 
managed. An excerpt in the binder read as follow: 
 
Any update? (Sent: early August, 2004)… Any update? (Sent: mid-August, 2004)… [blank 
forwarded e-mail with two previous e-mails enclosed] (Sent: mid-October, 2004), [Vendor 
Project Manager] pls assist to expedite. This item has been long outstanding (Sent: late 
November, 2004) [Vendor Project Manager], status [please]? This problem has been 
outstanding for very long. This was raised again during yesterday’s meeting with [Ops 
Manager]. Pls expedite the process (Sent: end December, 2004) 
 
The vendor’s complaint about vague user requirements was rebutted as the vendor’s incompetence, as 
these requirements were “common-sense requirements that good consultants should have anticipated” 
and that “some things are obvious - how can you build a toilet without the water pipe?”   
                                                   
4 This was ITD’s interpretation, even though some interviewees felt that the solution design for Project Alpha was “too big for (the old 
subcontractor) to solve,” and that they “finally surrendered after one and a half years.” 
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Despite the setback of the first crisis, ITD soon steered the project risk account back to the theme of 
vendor management. The risk mitigating actions by ITD were, thus, on the “right” track and the situation 
was “in control.” A review of the email correspondence between ITD and the vendor during this period 
revealed the continuation of a strong vendor management flavor, focusing largely on chasing progress 
updates, compliance to technical IT standards for the user interface, database design, component 
architecture, etc., but with little discussion of issues relating to innovation complexity or user 
requirement management.  
 
Moreover, being the only party that would interact with all key stakeholders (including relevant higher 
authority in the Corporate Unit), ITD wielded not just formal authority but also substantial “informational” 
advantage over others, even in shaping the risk picture before senior management. The regular updates 
to the steering committee (comprising senior management of ITD, users, and vendor) were often 
smooth and non-eventful. However, the interviews and the documents suggest that the senior 
management did not get the complete picture, reflective of the actual project realities. In fact, between 
November 2002 and March 2005, there was only one documented case of meeting minutes sent to the 
Project Steering Committee. Even then, the update slides to the steering committee did not convey the 
gravity of the concerns of the users or vendor at various stages. One of the steering committee 
members reflected subsequently on such reluctance of ITD to engage senior management:  
 
[ITD] sits through all the meetings and they are supposed to be on top of things. They need 
to do active monitoring, active participation and the guts to tell management bad stories and 
take (issues) by the hook. They cannot hide the bad news.  
 
As the deadlines for the project deliverables slipped, ITD exerted even more pressure on the vendor by 
demanding more frequent reporting and intermediate deliverables (e.g., design documentation). The 
vendor resisted, as it saw ITD’s actions as counter-productive, since ITD imposed more administrative 
burdens on the vendor’s project team, further draining its resources. The exasperation on both sides 
eventually led to open hostility between ITD and the vendor during meetings. The vendor, for example, 
complained about the lack of “respectful” interaction, which had led to many of its staff resigning, going 
on no-pay leave, or requesting transfers.  
 
We need our customers to be reasonable. We all have our self-esteem, our self-worth - not 
big egos. There’s no need for them (ITD) to hurl verbal abuse and “whip” the consultants 
upside down in the meetings. (Interview with Vendor Vice-President) 
 
ITD, on the other hand, was adamant. In fact, it believed the high staff turnover was simply due to “poor 
project management” on the part of the contractor in “over-relying on key personnel and failing to 
institute adequate succession planning.” To them, building good relationships with the vendor was 
unnecessary:  
 
We are not the best of buddies and we don’t go drinking together, that’s fine with me. Good 
relationship is immaterial to the project. We should concentrate on getting the deliverables. 
(Interview with Corporate Project Manager)  
 
The tight control of ITD in vendor management led to the deterioration of the relationship with the 
vendor. There were various occasions of heated exchanges, as noted by a senior manager in ITD.  
 
Both sides were very defensive. [Vendor] felt that users wanted more and more and [ITD] 
always sided with the users. On the user end, they felt that [Vendor] tried to avoid 
everything they asked. Instead of finding the workable solutions together, they were busy 
guarding each other’s interests… 
 
Such hostility perpetuated a divisive mindset. There were indications of one party picking up and 
highlighting signs of risk for the other party, yet these signs were ignored. For example, the vendor 
insisted on using its development approach and internal project structure, disregarding ITD’s attempts to 
raise concern of worsening integration complexity in Project Alpha. 
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 [The vendor] structured their development teams this way: the requirement analysts 
talked to users…there were also the developers and testers, and the testers did nothing 
but testing…there were gaps between analysts and developers – what the developers 
interpreted and implemented might not be congruent with the analysts, as they had made 
their assumptions without consulting the users. For the testers, if they did not have the 
knowledge from the rest, they could not come up with the test specs, and they took too 
long… the test days kept postponing as the test cases were not ready yet. (Interview with 
Corporate Project Manager) 
 
Similarly, the vendor and the subcontractor had sensed that Project Alpha “in the leaders’ minds was 
a transformation, but the ground people (in Land HMBU) feel that it’s only a migration,” and tried to 
communicate the need for careful change management. However, ITD felt that it had done enough 
and did not respond sufficiently to their concern about engaging the users more actively.  
 
There will be a monstrous transformation of [Land HMBU] community, so they must have 
change management. It’s not giving a talk here and there. You need to actively involve 
those people to change their mindset, and some people you need to chop (i.e., 
retrench)… We keep telling [Ops Manager] about change management and BPR 
(business process re-engineering), but [ITD] didn’t like us doing that and said, “Don’t tell 
me I miss this out.” (Interview with Subcontractor Project Manager) 
5.4. Second crisis – User/Vendor taking active roles in renegotiating dominant 
risk account 
In late 2004, the vendor mutinied unexpectedly by declaring what ITD referred to as an “information 
blackout,” abruptly cutting off all interactions between its consultants and ITD and the users. All pre-
planned requirement meetings with the users were cancelled. ITD and the users were caught 
completely off-guard.  
 
At first, we tried to clarify with them (regarding the sudden cancellation). The [vendor] 
analysts told us that it was a top management decision to churn out the requirements and 
they were not to have any meeting. (ITD Manager) 
 
Claiming that they had incurred a loss of a few million, their argument was that the user requirements 
should have been closed by early March 2002, as originally planned in the contract. The stand-off left 
the fate of Project Alpha hanging in limbo for several weeks. The vendor only returned to the 
discussion table after it had gained the commitment of the firm’s senior management to finalize and 
close all project requirements – the risk account that they had been trying to surface thus far.  
 
As the vendor returned, ITD still held onto its risk account and again attempted to actively manage 
the vendor by instituting a military-like emergency “operations center” at the project office to track the 
resolution of user requirements more closely. The occurrence of these unexpected events, however, 
substantially eroded the credibility of ITD’s dominant risk account.  
 
Unhappy with such developments, some users expressed their displeasure with the ITD for its 
inability to mitigate risks despite noticing “the same old routine of [the] vendor promising to get out of 
uncomfortable situations.”  
 
[ITD] was supposed to monitor and control the vendor. We saw a lot of monitoring but no 
control… [ITD] was not recovering fast enough to take grasp of the situation. (Interview 
with Deputy Ops Manager) 
 
The “operations center” soon lost its efficacy, as project charts and tables were not updated, ending 
up simply, as one project member noted ironically, as cosmetic “Chinese couplets”5 on the walls. The 
“operations center” was closed down in early 2005 after just three months. 
  
                                                   
5 Chinese couplets are auspicious verses written on red paper and typically displayed during the Chinese Lunar New Year. 
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Users began taking a more active role to renegotiate the dominant risk account and the related 
project priorities. User senior management raised a formal alert with the corporate management. 
The Head of Land HMBU pressured the ITD director to issue a formal memo to the corporate COO 
to reflect the dire state of Project Alpha, implicitly requesting an ultimatum for project closure. 
Through high-level senior management intervention between the vendor, ITD and the users, a more 
regular dialogue was instituted to keep track of the progress of Project Alpha. This process of 
dialogue brought about a more balanced context where inputs from all three parties were 
considered. Users, for example, also began acknowledging the issue of requirement management 
raised by the vendor.  
 
They (the project team members) don’t have the higher management focus… and are 
too bogged down at the tactical level. They don’t realize the importance of fixing the 
user requirements. (Interview with Head of Land HMBU) 
 
As a result, the project risk accounts that addressed tight requirement management (vendor) and 
innovation complexity (users) were now given higher priority. At the same time, the vendor 
management (ITD) risk account was attenuated with an agreement by all parties that there would 
be relatively less emphasis on sticking strictly to formal project documentation and procedures for 
the time being. A more “vendor-friendly” ITD senior manager (above the ITD corporate project 
manager) was also brought in to mediate interaction between ITD and the vendor. He co-chaired 
the Project Working Committee with the Head of HMBU. Users also pushed for open, frank, and 
truthful reporting in tracking the progress of Project Alpha instead of “waiting too late before raising 
it.” Careless promises from the vendor, for example, were frowned upon by the users.  
 
In some of the meetings, if the gut feel of the vendor is that they need nine months to 
complete a deliverable, they will put down nine months straight away! Can they stop 
being so optimistic? In one of the meetings, I told them upfront not to present the 
optimistic picture. They need to be realistic of what’s coming ahead. (Interview with 
Head of Land HMBU) 
 
It was also agreed that any major issues identified by ITD, users, or the vendor should be 
immediately brought to the others. Such facilitated interactions helped the various stakeholders to 
develop a more sophisticated understanding of the project requirements and the common 
appreciation of the complexity in the novel warehouse planning system. Accordingly, a more 
“sequential roll-out” approach was adopted. Project Alpha was divided into two components, with 
delivery efforts emphasizing the implementation of the transactional component first while taking a 
“small-win” approach toward delivering the more complex planning engine component. Such a 
prototyping approach required ITD and the users to be actively involved with the vendor to learn 
and agree on the acceptable design solutions.  
 
The (earlier) aggressive approach might not be the best. Our approach now is different, 
not big bang but through prototyping. Dynamic sorting, for example, is being 
experimented through a standalone system with a department. We practice first to get 
familiar with the concept. If it is ok, we will expand the solution to other processes. 
(Interview with Ops Manager, Land HMBU) 
 
The greater interactions among ITD, the users, and the vendor seemed to have enabled a more 
comprehensive understanding of risk, triggering the appropriate risk mitigating actions. Project 
Alpha was finally recognized as a “complex and large system with complex engine formulation and 
workflow” (as per project meeting minutes). Setting the algorithms and the underlying assumptions 
was “more complex than expected.” A key risk factor agreed upon was the lack of experience in 
domain expertise. Mitigation measures put in place included agreeing on the verification checklists 
of the planning engines upfront, instituting multiple trials and parallel runs, and extensive testing 
with good data sets to verify planning engines. The iterative and more concrete verification of 
planning engines enabled ITD, users, and vendor to sort out differences in requirement 
specifications and put the project back on course.  
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In mid-2006, the first transactional component was rolled out, followed by the containerization 
modules in early 2007. The full system (with its various planning modules) was finally completed at 
the end of 2007. 
6. Discussion 
The case of Project Alpha recounts the trajectory of a troubled project that is characterized by 
disruptions and multiple encounters of disagreement and conflict. Our close analysis reveals a 
dynamic social construction process. Figure 5 summarizes our observations as a process model that 
includes successive phases of risk construction, risk negotiation, and risk mitigating actions. As 
different stakeholders came to define and attach meanings to the critical risk in Project Alpha, their 
knowledge differentials (e.g., competencies/expertise, past experiences), vested interests (e.g., 
project roles and responsibilities), and value differences (e.g., IT - business - professional consulting 
culture) shaped the way they constructed their risk accounts. These factors are considered in our 
process model to be the “basis for risk construction.” They do not stay static in the course of IT 
projects, but are affected by various events that occur. For example, the fragmented access to and 
the uneven distribution of information created disparity in knowledge among ITD, the vendor, and the 
users in perceiving the risk of innovation complexity for Project Alpha. It was only later when the 
information flow became more balanced, that such complexity became evident. Other factors (e.g., 
the vested interests related to specific project roles) are, however, more stable and have a pervasive 
influence throughout the project. 
 
Similarly, the negotiation and contestation of risk accounts also manifested different degrees of 
intensity across phases. In the initial dominant phase, these risk accounts were passively negotiated. 
Given ITD’s superior position in the project management structure, its account was largely accepted 
as given and became the dominant risk account. The first focusing event – the bankruptcy of the first 
subcontractor – jolted the basis of risk construction by exposing new information or information privy 
to one party, creating an opportunity for reconstruction as competing risk accounts of the users and 
vendor sought to be heard. The intensity of contestation grew as ITD had to address these concerns 
and actively repair its risk account during the repair phase. With its superior authority and control of 
information flow, it (consciously or unconsciously) filtered contextual cues or edited “social reality” to 
present risks in ways that accentuated its risk account while discounting other risk accounts and 
superficially addressing their concerns (e.g., in commissioning an independent study). Finally, with 
the second focusing event, i.e., the vendor’s unexpected staging of an “information blackout,”  the 
context for negotiation and contestation was radically altered in the collective phase. With a 
revamped project management structure and a more balanced information flow, users now took 
charge in pushing a new order for the risk agenda. The continuous flux of negotiation and 
contestation and the uncertainties of their outcomes suggest a highly fluid and dynamic existence of 
IT project risk accounts.  
 
Finally, the legitimacy of risk-mitigating actions followed from the contestation outcomes among the risk 
accounts. In this case, we saw initial mitigating actions to address vendor management risks, moving 
toward even more intensive efforts to address such risks, before radically switching to deal with the risks 
of innovation complexity and controlling user requirements. It was interesting to observe that ITD was 
not lacking in its efforts to exert control over the project. ITD was tenaciously trying to mitigate risks 
throughout the course of Project Alpha, exerting tremendous pressure on the vendor. It was not true that 
controls were not present, but these controls were rendered according to a specific risk account and, 
hence, did not address the concerns articulated by risk accounts that emphasized other critical risks. 
The social constructionist perspective, thus, helps us to understand why we still see projects failing 
despite the application of seemingly heavy controls or risk mitigating actions. Moreover, these risk-
mitigating actions were dynamic. While they followed from a specific risk account, the dissonance 
resulting from the increasing misalignment between the mitigating actions and the risk realities did not 
necessarily dissipate but precipitated into focusing events that altered the basis for the risk 
(re)construction (e.g., the information blackout staged by the vendor). Such an interpretation, i.e., the 
possible self-correcting nature of risks through a focusing event, hints at the limit of social construction. 
It reaffirms the complementary risk management approach that we adopt here, i.e., while the social 
constructionist perspective is insightful, we cannot deny the objective realities of unmitigated risks.  
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The process model we propose from the analysis of Project Alpha illuminates the process of risk 
construction in an IT project. In the following discussion, we highlight a few noteworthy aspects of the 
process of social construction of risk: 
 
 
Figure 5. Key Phases in the Process of Social Construction of Risk in Project Alpha 
6.1. Social construction of risk is inherently fragmented and subject to a 
process of negotiation and contestation  
Unlike extant literature that assumes a homogeneous and objective set of project risks, we found that 
different stakeholders in Project Alpha held onto differing accounts that identified different aspects of 
the project as risk. Stakeholders in the project came from diverse backgrounds, played unique roles, 
and harbored divergent vested interests. Hence, their accounts of where the risks were and how to 
solve them were different. These risk accounts constituted what the different stakeholder groups 
understood as potential causes of project failing, as they made sense of the ambiguity and 
uncertainty surrounding the project. ITD saw the risk in managing the vendor. Users saw the risk in 
managing innovation complexity, and the vendor saw the risk in controlling user requirements. 
However, as the different risk accounts were brought together, they were subject to a process of 
negotiation and contestation (active or passive) in constructing overall risk perceptions. As different 
stakeholders took control, different accounts of risk and the related mitigating actions were amplified 
or attenuated (e.g., the consistent amplification of vendor management as the “real issue” by ITD, and 
ITD’s repeated brushing aside of the vendor’s concern about requirement management as an “irritant 
but not show-stopper”). The consequence was a fragmented view of risk, as weak signals from other 
risk accounts were ignored or discounted. The lack of a big picture view, for example, was noted by a 
senior manager in the user group in reflecting on lessons learned:  
 
We were not fast enough to recover quickly to take grasp of the situation. There is no one 
to watch the bigger picture, to watch out for key areas…. (Interview with Head of Land 
HMBU) 
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As we saw in Project Alpha, the consequence was severe. The fragmented risk accounts by different 
stakeholders, which were not reconciled until very late in the project, had a significant negative impact 
on the project and jeopardized its completion.  
6.2. Broader social structures predispose the risk construction in specific 
directions  
Moreover, the negotiation and contestation of the risk accounts among the different stakeholders do not 
develop in a vacuum, but are shaped by broader social structures. These structures perpetuate specific 
social orders that amplify some risk accounts but attenuate others, having direct consequences on risk-
mitigating actions. In Project Alpha, the broader social structure took the form of project governance, 
i.e., the turnkey development approach. The turnkey approach imposed a significant bearing on the 
process of risk construction, triggering a specific “fixated” response from ITD from its well-established 
repertoire of system development methodologies (though the turnkey development approach had been 
a relatively new addition). ITD saw it as a redistribution of project risk to the vendor and, thus, defined its 
role narrowly as vendor manager, instead of taking the broader ownership of project management 
responsibility that it would assume in other system development projects. Such a mindset was not 
limited to ITD alone. In a way, the users contracted ITD to deliver their IT system; ITD then contracted 
with the vendor to design, implement, and deliver; the vendor, in turn, outsourced the analytical engines 
to the subcontractor. The way the turnkey contracting approach was executed perpetuated a divisive 
“you-versus-me” mindset. Such a mindset inhibited the construction of a larger and richer picture of risk. 
The hands-off approach compartmentalized the roles and responsibilities and set the stage for a divided 
ITD-Users-Vendor project team. As each of them acted on their roles over the course of the project, 
their different interests and narrow motivations led naturally to the divergent construction of project risk 
from their own perspectives. 
 
Such fragmentation was further reinforced by the project management structure that favored a specific 
balance in power. The formal authority vested upon ITD as the corporate project manager gave ITD an 
upper hand in shaping the construction of risk (e.g., its informational advantage, resource access to 
enact mitigating actions). Its risk account of tight vendor management arising from the turnkey 
contracting approach dominated the others. Murmurs of concerns from the other risk perspectives were 
voiced but not heard. The construction of the risk account and the related mitigating actions for the 
Project Alpha remained in the hands of a very small team of ITD managers. Their advantageous 
position in the project enabled them to construct a specific risk account and yet retained an air of 
rationality that “can be argued against but not rejected as being irrational” (Hansson 1989, p.108). 
Manning (1989, p.366) noted such maneuvers to justify and repair risk accounts as “the editing” or 
bracketing of cues and events for socially constructing reality and representing it to the organization. 
Until a later stage of Project Alpha when signs of trouble became glaringly obvious, the risk account of 
ITD was largely left uncontested. The finding, thus, suggests that the dominant risk account could 
possibly converge and be perpetuated with little or no need for explicit negotiation, due to the presence 
of a power imbalance embedded within the governance structure of such complex projects. It also 
explains why some stakeholders have a much greater ability than others to shape the social 
construction of risk.  
6.3. Focusing events trigger the social re-construction of risk 
Although ITD had an upper hand in pushing its agenda, the dominance of its risk account could not be 
taken for granted and needed careful defending and continuous “repair” to align with the surrounding 
events. The finding reaffirms that “closure” (in resolving multiple risk accounts) is a matter of degree 
(Pinch & Bijker, 1984). ITD’s dominant risk account was unstable and had to be continuously defended, 
i.e., through systematic reasoning (Renn, 2008). The dominant risk account, however, may be “jolted” 
by specific crises or major events that are incongruent with such a risk account, casting doubts on the 
current position and triggering a renegotiation of the social order in constructing a new risk account. 
Such events may precipitate internally or surface entirely from external sources. These focusing events 
are interesting, as they provide the ingredients for multiple interpretations by the various stakeholders to 
reorganize their risk accounts. They afford the occasion to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions in 
the project, and often destabilize the dominant risk account and trigger fundamental shifts in the risk 
agenda (Birkland, 1998; Majchrzak et al., 2000).  
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However, such challenges may or may not be successful. For example, while ITD had to repair its 
account of risk after the first crisis, the broader social structures inherent in the turnkey development 
approach and the ITD-dominant project management structure were weakened but did not change; ITD 
as the Corporate Project Manager continued to enjoy a privileged position in the project management 
structure. Vendor management as a risk continued to be amplified while the risk accounts of others 
were attenuated. In contrast, these social structures were shaken and successfully displaced in the 
second crisis.  The ITD-dominant project management structures were changed as the User Ops 
Manager assumed more control and the corporate unit introduced new oversight authority (ITD Senior 
Manager) over the ITD Project Manager to facilitate interaction with the vendor. Users and the vendor 
could now surface, package, and substantiate their risk accounts, legitimatizing their amplification. 
Similarly, the turnkey development approach became more incremental and participative as a prototype 
development approach was adopted. These findings suggest that the process by which a dominant risk 
account is re-opened for negotiation is more challenging. It involves substantial efforts to change the 
governance structure, shift the power balance, and leverage elements of emergent focusing events to 
support a different risk account. The possible occurrence of such focusing events and their reshaping 
uncertainties suggests that the process of risk construction is more dynamic than expected, as these 
events (endogenous or exogenous) can radically alter the attention on competing risk accounts or even 
create new risk accounts.  
7. Contributions to Research and Practice 
7.1. A social constructionist perspective of IT risk management 
The case illustrates the usefulness of a social constructionist perspective in understanding risk 
management in a complex IT project. Recognizing risk as a social construction suggests that risk 
outcomes are inseparable from the process that produces them. Our analysis does not suggest that 
IT projects can do away with conventional technical risk assessments, but it does suggest that behind 
the facade of objectivity, there is a deeper socialization process that has a strong bearing in shaping 
the eventual definition of IT risks in complex projects. Understanding the socialization process 
addresses the question of why certain aspects of a project are identified, amplified as risk factors, and 
mitigated against, while others are ignored or brushed aside, with direct consequence on project 
outcomes.  
 
For example, the large and established ITD had employed various risk management artifacts and 
methodologies in Project Alpha, e.g., the use of AHP in vendor selection, software quality assurance, 
project documentation standards, and the formal setup of an IT command center in managing critical 
operations. But these artifacts and methodologies were employed from the perspective of a single 
risk account of tightening vendor management. While they provided ITD with an inflated sense of 
security and confidence, they were limited in efficacy in addressing the other problems. The selection 
process for what constitutes a risk and what does not is not arbitrary, but tightly intertwined with the 
underlying social processes. The social constructionist perspective, thus, changes the questions we 
ask in IT risk management research. It helps to shift the IT risk management perspective toward a 
stronger process orientation. Greater emphasis should be placed on the risk assessment process and 
not just on the outcome (e.g., better risk calculation, more comprehensive methodologies), risk 
conversation and not just a checklist, risk culture and not just risk technology. This process-centric 
view means that the construction of risk is not a one-time exercise, but a continuously evolving effort 
as the socialization dynamic changes over time. Thus, treating risks as social constructs offers an 
important complementary perspective to theorize about IT risk management.  
7.2. A process model of the social construction of IT project risk  
We also propose from our analysis a process model that illustrates the social construction of risk in the 
management of complex IT projects. First, the process model highlights the role of social structures 
within the project context (e.g., institutionalized project governance and project management structure) 
in shaping the ensuing interaction within each phase. This is consistent with one of the precepts of 
process studies – that social processes are “embedded in the contexts that produce and are produced 
by them” (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 340). Second, by bracketing the IT project temporally, our process model 
draws attention to the socialization dynamics (e.g., the need for negotiation and contestation, the 
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reshaping dynamism of focusing events) in risk construction. We show how these factors in one phase 
influence the subsequent basis of risk construction, the negotiation and contestation of risk accounts, 
and the legitimacy of risk-mitigating actions taken in future phases (Langley, 1999). Together these two 
features of the process model show why risk construction cannot be divorced from the broader social 
structures, e.g., the political decision-making process. Finally, it also shows that dominant risk accounts, 
while difficult to challenge and reopen for negotiation, can be displaced through dramatic focusing 
events. These focusing events, like critical encounters (Cho, Mathiassen, & Nilsson, 2008; Newman & 
Robey, 1992) or critical incidents (Lyytinen & Newman, 2008) discussed in IS process studies are 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for change in existing constructions of project risk. 
 
The notion of project risk is, thus, dynamic, a tentative product of and ingredient for social interaction 
that is open to new definitions, solutions, and terms (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Manning, 1989). The 
process model brings together the consideration of the social agents (multiple stakeholders), the 
external and more persistent social structural factors, and the internal and more emergent socialization 
dynamism factors to provide a holistic picture for us to understand the ongoing process through which 
risk is socially constructed and reconstructed. As such, our process model extends the growing stream 
of IS literature that has used the process approach in analyzing IS projects (e.g., Azad & Faraj, 2008; 
Cho et al., 2008; Lyytinen & Newman, 2008) into the domain of IT project risk management. 
7.3. Implications for IT Risk Management Practices 
In terms of contribution to practice, this research also highlights the need to manage the risk accounts 
from multiple stakeholders given the inherent fragmentation in complex projects. Different stakeholder 
groups are alert to different risks and new risks at different points in time (but never quite at the same 
time) as they enact different roles and as different trajectories of events occur. In other words, the 
relationship between stakeholders and IT project outcomes is more nuanced and complex than 
previously understood (Lyytinen et al., 1998; Schmidt et al., 2001). Our study shows that project 
management must manage the risk accounts of key stakeholders. Such a diversity of risk accounts is 
natural in complex projects and should be tapped to stimulate knowledge exchange to enlarge the risk 
picture, given that risk perceptions are often externalized to other stakeholders (Keil, Tiwana, & Bush, 
2002). At the same time, project managers should be conscious of their own potential biases or blind 
spots arising from their roles and project expectations. They may need to rethink the top-down, 
authoritative approach, since this may unintentionally mute or remove important alternative views. Left 
unmanaged, the risk construction process and the related risk mitigating actions may only be done or 
decided by a “selected few” who hold dominant positions (including themselves), leading to 
dysfunctional risk management. It explains how individual preferences, political power, and private 
information get translated through the risk construction process into critical project decisions.  
 
Project managers, thus, need to be more sensitive to the socialization dynamics underlying risk 
construction. In particular, a useful perspective follows from the notion of “collective mindfulness” (Weick 
& Roberts, 1993). Through their work with high-reliability organizations, Weick and Roberts have found 
that a successful approach to risk is built on a demanding social regime that is sensitive to multiple 
viewpoints of risk and encourages “perceptual malleability” (Langer, 1989; Weick & Roberts, 1993). It 
requires the fostering of social processes that are preoccupied with failures, reluctant to simplify 
observations, sensitive to operations, committed to resilience, and structurally under-specified for fluid 
decision making. This collective perspective collates and integrates various risk accounts to give 
meaning to “weak signals,” thus triggering the appropriate risk mitigating responses. It  supplies the 
dynamic discerning capability for project members to doubt, ask about, and update their mental picture 
of risk continuously (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). In the case of Project Alpha, such interventions 
in social context did come, albeit belatedly, e.g., through the establishment of regular dialogue among 
ITD, users, and the vendor, and the appointment of a more vendor-friendly ITD senior manager to 
mediate between ITD and the vendor. The change in the socialization dynamic (i.e., more frequent, 
more fluid, two-way communication) facilitated the social reconstruction of risk.  
 
Project managers should be reminded that a key role they play is to structure “critical dialogue” among 
key stakeholders. Focused efforts may be required to engineer the social context to enhance 
“collectiveness,” e.g., correcting imbalance in project authority, co-locating client-vendor work teams, 
promoting team building activities, instituting forums for knowledge sharing, and realigning joint 
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incentives. Project managers should work toward facilitating healthy social processes to enable a richer 
and more comprehensive risk construction for greater effectiveness in risk mitigation.  
7.4. Limitations and future research 
As our research is an early attempt to understand the social construction of risk within the context of IT 
projects, additional research should be conducted to shed further light on this area. Given our research 
question, we conducted an in-depth case study of a single failing IT project using narrative and temporal 
bracketing strategies to inductively build our process model. While these strategies provide relatively 
high accuracy and richness, they necessarily lead to tradeoffs in terms of limited generalizability of the 
process model and our theoretical insights (Langley, 1999). In our case, the process model may be 
specific to complex projects with multi-vendor arrangements. Further research should be done to 
explore the applicability of the proposed process of social construction of risk within other IT projects of 
varying complexity and different governance structures. On the other hand, our process model may 
serve as a heuristic for critique and reformulation (Van de Ven & Poole, 1990, p. 532) and an initial 
theoretical foundation for more empirical research within the domain of IT project risk. 
 
Another limitation of our research, as indicated earlier, is that it is principally based on archival data and 
retrospective accounts. We attempted to mitigate this with active triangulation of archival and interview 
data, but future studies should consider other data collection methods such as direct observations or 
extended interviews of participants at regular intervals to “capture reality in flight” (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 
347) and thereby enrich and extend the findings of our research (Van de Ven, 2007).  
 
Finally, this research extends IT risk research by explicating the nature of IT risks as products of social 
interactions and social structures. As we have discussed, we believe that our approach (social 
construction process) is complementary to traditional risk approaches that focus mainly on the objective 
aspects. Future research may adopt an integrated approach that includes elements from the rational-
choice, cognitive-behavioral, and social-constructionist approaches. One potential research question 
may be to extend the current single process analysis to multiple processes as proposed by Pettigrew 
(1997) and recently highlighted in Lyytinen and Newman’s socio-technical change model (2008). For 
example, we could study how the social construction process interacts with the cognitive-behavioral 
escalation process (Mähring & Keil, 2008). Researchers could explore the interactions between these 
two processes e.g., whether they are evolving in parallel or in overlapping sequence or if specific social 
interactions influence both the intersubjective perspective of risk and the individual level perception of 
risk. 
8. Conclusion 
To conclude, research has shown many IT projects exceed their budget, hobble past their scheduled 
delivery date, or deliver systems that fail to meet user requirements. These challenged projects continue 
to drain valuable organizational resources, and could ultimately end in a painful and protracted demise. 
This study demonstrates the relevance of a social constructionist perspective to enrich existing rational-
choice or cognitive-behavioral approaches in managing IT risk for complex projects. Such projects often 
contain many risk signals, coming from different parts of the project, picked up by different stakeholders 
in the process. Understanding the notion of risk as a social construction is, thus, useful in clarifying why 
some signals constitute risks while others do not. Specifically, our study shows how risk is socially 
constructed through a process of articulating, negotiating, and contesting by various stakeholders in the 
project. The directions of the interaction are influenced by the broader social structures and can be 
dynamically reshaped by sudden focusing events. The process is highly emergent, demanding 
continuous management attention to the underlying social dynamics. Treating project risk as a social 
construct offers another perspective to theorize about project risk management, not just in 
understanding how stakeholder sense-making is related to risk construction, but also in broadening the 
project risk considerations to include the influence of social structures and processes. This heightened 
awareness of social structures and processes should also help to enhance the effectiveness of IT 
managers in deploying traditional risk management approaches. 
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